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ABSTRACT: We can increase our understanding of expres-
sion by considering an analogy to demonstrative reference. The 
connections between a demonstrative phrase and its referent, 
in a case of fully successful communication with that phrase, 
are analogous to the connections between an expressible state 
and the behavior that expresses it. The connections in each case 
serve to maintain a certain status for the connected elements: 
as actions of persons; or as objects, events, or states significant 
to persons. The analogy to demonstrative reference helps show 
that a positive account of expression can make conceptual con-
nections between expressed states and expressive behaviors 
without courting reductive behaviorism. A general account 
of expression as marked by these connections is compared to 
accounts of expression offered by Dorit Bar-On and Mitchell 
Green. Bar-On’s account turns out to be compatible with the 
account proposed here, once some of its consequences are fully 
appreciated. Green’s account rules out, as not expressive, some 
behaviors like crouching (in fear) that intuitively seem expres-
sive. When Green’s account is altered to allow such behaviors 
back in, the resulting account also fits the one proposed.
I. INTRODUCTION
he notion of expression is often characterized negatively. For example, ex-
pressions of emotion might be contrasted with descriptions of emotion. We might 
indicate the expressive character of a gesture, such as catching hold of a child’s 
hand, by denying that it was performed as a means to an end. The hand-holding, 
we might say, expresses affection rather than ensuring safe passage across a street. 
Making such contrasts emphasizes the especially tight connections between the 
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behaviors and states related by expression. But it doesn’t fully illuminate the nature 
of those connections.
A negative characterization of the expressive connection can be completely 
effective when the concept of expression is deployed to illuminate something else. 
Michael Dummett, for example, opposes the expressive relation between language 
and thought to the relation that would hold if language were merely a code for 
thought. He gives a careful exposition of what he means by a ‘mere code,’ and 
makes the intuitive notion of expression on which he relies more specific only 
by contrast with it. David Finkelstein relies on, but does not analyze, a notion of 
expression in distinguishing between conscious and unconscious states of mind. 
And Dorit Bar-On relies on a notion of expression to give an account of the dis-
tinctive properties of avowals.1 Bar-On is especially clear that her characteriza-
tion of expressive relations is negative. She explores a positive characterization 
of expressive behavior as sufficient to show the states it expresses. But she argues 
that her account of avowals doesn’t depend on the ultimate success of that positive 
characterization. What matters is only the truth of her negative characterization. 
Bar-On argues that expressive relations are not mediated by judgments in which 
an agent explicitly identifies either the states expressed or the person whose states 
they are.2 That is, when “My head aches” expresses my pain, my basis for making 
the claim includes neither any judgment of the form, “Someone has a headache, 
and I am that person” nor any judgment of the form, “My head feels someway, 
and that way is achy.”
Negative accounts of expression can be used to accomplish a great deal. And 
positive accounts face real dangers. A positive account that emphasized the distinc-
tive and significant character of expressive ties might make them simply mysteri-
ous.3 On the other hand, a positive account that carefully avoided mystery might be 
suspected of driving toward behaviorist reductionism. Keeping expressive relations 
interesting but non-mysterious might require tying expressed states very closely to 
their expressings. If the ties are very close, the states could turn out to be nothing 
but dispositions to those expressings. Unless those dispositions include disposi-
tions to be in cognitive or affective states, we will have reduced expressible mental 
states to (purely) behavioral dispositions. And if that happened, we wouldn’t have 
any reason to continue calling such behavior ‘expressive.’ The behavior wouldn’t 
bring anything else out.4
Nevertheless, our intuitive judgments about what counts as expressive are strong, 
and often uncontroversial. So we should be able to sketch a positive account of 
what makes a relation expressive. This sketch would codify our classifications of 
some, but not all, of our behavior as expressive, after we’ve reflected on which of 
those classifications are appropriate. Deciding which pre-theoretical classifications 
need revision, and which are genuine counter-examples to a developing sketch, is 
complicated. While developing such a sketch is an exercise in conceptual analysis, 
some of those decisions might very well turn on empirical questions.5 This paper 
identifies features a positive account of expression should have, if it is to resonate 
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with our reasons for caring about expressivity in the first place. It argues that an 
account with such features would be neither mysterious nor an invitation to behav-
iorist reductionism. We can take seriously our sense that we engage immediately 
and deeply with one another in our expressive behavior without falling into either 
of those traps.
Both the identification of the features, and the argument that they lead neither 
to mystification nor reductionism, proceed by analogy. The analogue is an account 
of the ties between topic and speech in some communication that employs demon-
stratives. In both cases, there are tight links between aspects of a total package 
(reference, or expression). The links serve to preserve the status of the items in the 
package as actions of persons or objects, events, or states significant to persons. 
The links keep accounts of individuals performing those actions, or being in those 
states, at the person level of explanation. Persons are agents capable of intentional 
action, who are usually intelligible as rationally motivated. And at the person 
level of explanation, they are in view as our objects of concern.6 Weeping in grief, 
like saying, “I can’t believe she’s gone” after the death of a loved one, should be 
understood at the person level. (It need not be understood as an intended action.) 
This will be argued as the details of the analogy are worked out.
I discuss the referential case first, and show that the links appealed to in this ac-
count of it are neither mysterious nor reductively behaviorist. I then explain which 
features of the referential case have analogues in the expressive case. In evaluating 
the resultant sketch of expressive relations, I first compare it to Bar-On’s treatment 
of conceptual connections between expressed states and expressive behavior. The 
comparison enables me to show that a positive account of expression can insist on 
conceptual connections among the aspects of an expressive whole without courting 
behaviorism. Finally, I consider Mitchell Green’s positive account of expression, 
which requires that expressive behavior be designed to show what it expresses. 
I argue that his account wrongly excludes some behaviors (such as crouching) 
that show emotions (such as fear). Altering his account to justify treating these 
behaviors as expressive would bring it in line with the sketch this paper proposes. 
I conclude by noting that, if we accept this sketch, we’d have an explanation for 
why accounts of expression and accounts of first-personal self-awareness often 
draw on one another.
II. DEMONSTRATIVE REFERENCE7
A. AN INTUITIVE PICTURE
When I say to a friend at a playground, “That girl looks ill,” the status of my utter-
ance as fully understandable depends on the perceptible girl. (The relevant notion 
of ‘fully understandable’ is explained below.) But both the utterance and the girl 
are perfectly concrete. Neither is inner, as (say) my sorrow is (or may seem to be) 
inner. The notions ‘being understandable’ and ‘being perceived’ are not necessar-
ily easy to unpack. But neither a failure to perceive, nor a consequent failure to 
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understand, is especially mysterious. My friend will want to perceive the relevant 
girl. She will take herself to still have a job to do so long as she doesn’t yet know 
which girl is in question. That’s true even if she is aware that I intend to be speaking 
about a particular girl, and am telling her, of that girl, that she is ill.
There is a difference between being able to characterize a speaker as attempting 
to inform us about some topic, and understanding the speaker in understanding 
what she said. And there are conversational conventions that suggest we regularly 
operate with a pre-theoretic recognition of that difference. The conventions are more 
obvious when they are being violated. For example, I sometimes fake compliance 
with them. That is, I’ll say, “Yes, of course” to a question like, “Do you remember 
that house we saw the day your sister graduated?” because I just want my husband 
to finish his story. Needless to say, when I do this, I don’t want to be found out. 
And I’m quite annoyed when I realize someone is doing this to me.8
The difference between successful and unsuccessful communication with de-
monstratives doesn’t seem mysterious. If my friend speaks English and perceives 
the right girl, she fully understands me; if not, not. There is a tight connection 
between my utterance and the girl, but noting this doesn’t (for example) appear to 
commit us to any but a naturalist account of the communicative exchange. We can 
investigate the connections between demonstrative and referent—between ‘that girl’ 
and the girl herself—to identify features of this kind of tight connection. Drawing 
the analogies to the connections between expressings and what they express will 
give us a blueprint for a positive account of expressive connections. The blueprint 
itself, if not its further development, will be free of overt appeals to the notion of 
expression. That will help alleviate the worry that the only tight connections are 
mysterious ones.
B. CONNECTIONS BETWEEN WORD AND WORLD
In central cases, a phrase like ‘that girl’ has a referent and expresses a sense.9 The 
sense is grasped by the speaker and by anyone who fully understands her utterance. 
The relevant notion of understanding requires more of a hearer than that she can 
identify the sentence-type used, and imagine possible speech-acts a speaker might 
reasonably wish to use it to perform. Of course, imagining what another person 
was trying to communicate requires one to have appreciated a good bit about the 
words he or she uttered. There is certainly a sense of ‘understand’ that can simply 
track that level of appreciation. My target is not understanding in that sense, but 
rather cases of what I will call full understanding: cases of full communicative 
success, as could occur between my friend and me at the playground if she knows 
to which girl I refer. The connections among the elements in that kind of case are 
my focus.10 (While I continue to use ‘full understanding,’ other qualifications to 
this effect will be dropped in what follows.) I’ll list them and then characterize the 
second and third connections more fully.
(1) Reference: As used by the speaker, the phrase ‘that girl’ refers to Jane.
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(2) Referent-dependence: A hearer fully understands the utterance contain-
ing the phrase only if she perceives Jane.11 So for the utterance to be fully 
understandable, the phrase ‘that girl’ must in fact have a referent it would 
be possible for a hearer to perceive.12 So the status of ‘that girl’ as a refer-
ring phrase in this context depends on the existence of that referent—Jane. 
The phrase’s identity (here) as a referring phrase depends on its relation 
to Jane.
(3) Sense-dependence: at least at the moment, and without essaying other 
thoughts, a speaker attends to Jane only in virtue of grasping, or being 
capable of grasping, the sense of ‘that girl.’ The hearer’s situation is more 
complicated. Of course my friend may have been watching Jane attentively 
without formulating any thoughts she would naturally use the phrase ‘that 
girl’ in communicating to me. But if my friend was watching Jane then 
my friend is in a position to grasp the sense of ‘that girl’ (or perhaps ‘that 
kid’).
(4) Embodied agents: some of the connections among speaker/hearer, sig-
nificant phrase (‘that girl’), and referent (Jane herself) are both causal and 
cognitively significant (such as the visual connection between the speaker 
and Jane). Descriptions of either the speaker’s meaningful performance, or 
of the task of understanding facing the hearer, belong at the person-level 
of explanation. To talk about speaking, hearing, or seeing in the relevant 
senses is to talk about intelligible activities of persons.
The relations I’ve labeled referent-dependence and sense-dependence fall out 
of the intuitive view of conversational tasks sketched above. Consider referent-
dependence first. To see at what level the dependence lies, consider a case of what 
you would count as fully successful demonstrative reference. Depending on your 
preferred philosophy of language, you will cash out success in different ways. 
For example, if you typically make a firm distinction between semantic meaning 
and speaker meaning, you will want to consider a case where you judge them to 
coincide. In such a case, the status of ‘that girl’ as a phrase whose (public) sense 
is a constituent of the speaker’s belief, or as a referring phrase the appropriate 
understanding of which would take a hearer to the speaker’s intended referent, or 
however else you wish to cash this out, depends on Jane.
This looks tautologous. If we define ‘successful singular reference’ as use of 
an appropriate referring term or phrase in a context where the referent exists,13 
and then say that a term or phrase is only really a referring term or phrase when 
a speaker accomplishes successful reference with it, then it is obviously true that 
the status of the phrase as referring depends on the existence of the referent. But 
a theory of reference will incorporate something like this claim if it respects our 
intuitions about what hearers must do to understand demonstrative expressions. 
Whether one thinks a theory of meaning strictly construed must pay attention to the 
tasks of hearers depends on how, and how firmly, one distinguishes semantics from 
pragmatics. The paradigm notion of complete understanding at issue in ordinary 
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conversation tracks many features that some would label merely pragmatic.14 In any 
case, however it is labeled, we’ve seen there is a key difference, tacitly appreciated 
by ordinary speakers, between (a) fully understanding what someone said, where 
that requires understanding what determinate move in the language game she made; 
and (b) being able to characterize some moves a speaker could have made with the 
(bare) words you heard her utter.15 And Jane is needed for the phrase ‘that girl’ to 
be fully understandable in the stronger, relevant sense.
In the absence of a referent—as when a speaker has hallucinated an object—a 
hearer can certainly give an interpretation of what the speaker is likely up to. The 
interpretation will preserve the speaker’s status as reasonable, as wanting to speak 
sense rather than nonsense. But without the referent of the speaker’s demonstrative 
phrase, we can’t construe the speaker as intentionally doing something determinate 
(something known to us). We can only hold open the possibility that she is doing 
something or other.
Now consider sense-dependence. The speaker’s only way of thinking of Jane (at 
that particular moment) is bound up with her ability to pick her out perceptually. 
So there is no way to specify what the speaker is thinking without referring to Jane, 
and referring to Jane as the speaker does: non-descriptively. But if an observer is 
able to report the speaker’s thought or speech transparently, she is thereby able to 
grasp the sense of ‘that girl.’ Her relation to Jane is similar enough to the speaker’s 
relation to Jane to give her that ability.
This is the analogue for sense-dependence of the trivial truth about referring 
expressions discussed above. The speaker is now engaged with Jane demonstra-
tively. In order for anyone else, or the speaker herself later on, to engage with Jane 
in the way the speaker then does, the engagement must constitute, or suffice for, a 
grasp of ‘that girl.’ Again the trivial truth points to one less trivial. If the speaker 
herself—as opposed to a sub-personal part of her—is represented as engaged with 
Jane, then in that representation, Jane needs to be picked out in a way that respects 
how the speaker could herself at that time be engaged with Jane. (No such require-
ment holds if we are instead representing the speaker’s retinal nerve as stimulated 
by light reflected from Jane.16) We’re supposing that the speaker is cognitively 
engaged with Jane because of her perceptual connection to her, and not because 
she is deploying a definite description that happens to be satisfied by Jane. In that 
case, relevant features of the speaker’s perceptual relation to Jane need to figure 
in the hearer’s relation to Jane. It is the relation itself that is doing the work, so 
the hearer needs to relate to Jane in a way that is adequately similar to the way the 
speaker does.17 This generalizes beyond the speaker’s actual audience: to represent 
the speaker as referring to Jane, Jane needs to be picked out (in that representation) 
as the speaker picks her out. And anyone representing the speaker who manages to 
do that will either grasp, or be immediately able to grasp, the sense of ‘that girl.’
Referent-dependence and sense-dependence are types of tight connection between 
aspects of a total package: successful communication with demonstratives. That 
formulations of the connections can sound trivial is due to their being connections 
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within what is admitted (for the purposes of discussion) to be a genuine whole. 
Obviously, if we are talking about wholes, there are tight connections among their 
parts considered as parts. The point of interest for a potential analogy with wholes 
united by expressive ties is the way these two relations function to keep reference 
in the picture as an agent’s determinate act. Only if the referent and the sense are 
available to a hearer can she fully engage with a speaker’s communicative act. In 
their absence—if there is no girl on the playground, or if the hearer can’t get in a 
position to grasp the sense of a demonstrative reference to a girl who is there—then 
a hearer can only offer interpretations of what kind of engagements might have 
been possible.
III. EXPRESSION
A. A TEMPLATE FOR ACCOUNTS OF EXPRESSIVE WHOLES
Analogues of the same four connections present in successful communication with 
demonstratives mark our expression of our states. Before supporting this claim, 
I’ll discuss a general similarity between the two cases. Arguments against granting 
sui generis status to either demonstrative reference or expression usually involve 
an attempt to show that the jobs done by them can be done by descriptions. That 
is, phrases like ‘that girl’ are reconstrued as abbreviations for definite descrip-
tions. And expressive activities, whether verbal or not, are reconstrued as codes 
for descriptions of a subject’s present state of mind, or of the response she desires 
from her audience. Anti-descriptivist moves on expression’s behalf sometimes 
court reductive behaviorism, or undermine descriptivism only about qualitative 
states and not anything else to which our attention might be directed. A similar 
problem affects many discussions of singular reference: it is hard to keep hold of 
the possibility that a subject could be thinking about something, that it could be 
cognitively significant to her, without her thinking about it by describing it.18 That 
sense could be non-descriptive is a missing option, both for reference to middle 
size dry goods and expressible states of subjects.
For example, consider the implied dilemma in Joachim Schulte’s rejection of 
the claim that avowals are primarily used to make claims about our mental states: 
“In speaking of my being afraid I do not normally mean to describe it; I mean to be 
consoled, for instance” (1993, 161). Schulte assumes that because the appropriate 
response to an avowal of fear would be to offer consolation, and because most people 
avowing fear within earshot of others would know that, it can’t be that the avowal 
is about the fear. But this is because his model for an avowal of fear being about 
that fear is that the avowing agent is undertaking to describe her fear, presumably 
with the sole purpose of informing an audience about it.
The blind-spot in this particular way of dealing with a descriptivist threat to 
expression’s status is thrown into relief by comparison with the referential case. 
Schulte’s dilemma is transparently odd in the case of demonstrative reference. 
Suppose, while building a deck with you, I shout, “That bolt is loose!” I certainly 
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“mean” (in Schulte’s sense) for you to do something right now to secure it. But 
I’m certainly thinking about it, and communicating a claim about it to you. And 
I expect you to be able to think about it non-descriptively because I expect it will 
be immediately perceptually salient to you in the way it is to me. I expect you to 
secure the bolt because I expect you to grasp the sense of what I said. You’re in 
a position to do the securing because you’re in a position to do the grasping. A 
speaker who successfully communicates with a demonstrative is not related to the 
referent of that demonstrative merely behavioristically. But neither is being in that 
relation (or, for the hearer, coming to be in it) a matter of deploying a description. 
Accounts of expressive relations as sui generis also need to construe subjects as 
cognitively but not descriptively related to their expressed states.
In both cases, the status of one aspect of the total phenomenon—of reference, 
or expression—as person-level essentially depends on its connection to another 
aspect of the total phenomenon. I will argue for this in the course of arguing for 
the presence, in expressive wholes, of analogues to the four connections presented 
above. So consider, first, a case of natural expression—of my weeping and my 
sorrow. (I’ll discuss non-natural expressions below.) Here are four candidate rela-
tions between them:
(1) Expression: my weeping expresses my sorrow.
(2) Expressed-dependence: my weeping depends on my sorrow in the sense 
that my sorrow must be referred to in any description of my weeping 
that keeps it a person-level phenomenon (as opposed to a sub-personal 
phenomenon). Eyes can weep in the way wounds do; but then none of the 
eyes, the tears, or the weeping is expressive.
(3) Expressing-dependence: my sorrow depends on my weeping in the 
sense that picking out my sorrow as a possible state of a person requires 
a specification of it that adverts to (actual or possible/appropriate) weep-
ing. This is sense-level, rather than reference-level, dependence.19 It is 
not the claim that sorrow itself is a disposition to weep, but the claim 
that the specification of sorrow as sorrow involves (among much else) 
the concept of weeping.20 The relevant involvement may be cashed out 
in different ways. In some cases, the specification of a human mental or 
emotional state is descriptively complex, and includes concepts of behavior 
expressive of that state. In other cases the dependence will be less robust. 
It may, for example, simply be that no one would be competent to apply 
the concept of the state who wasn’t also competent to apply the concept 
of the expressive behavior.
(4) Embodied agents: some connections among subject, emotion or mental 
state, and overt behavior are both causal and cognitively significant.
Before arguing that these connections obtain, I will ward off a potential misin-
terpretation of my aim. I have suggested that looking at demonstratives would help 
make plausible the idea of tight but not mysterious connections among expressive 
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phenomena. Some readers might consider Wittgenstein’s notion of criterial relations 
to be an approach that makes expression interesting only by shifting the burden of 
mystery (to criteria). And the above presentation of the four connections sounds 
quite like Cavell’s development of Wittgenstein’s views.21 Those not antecedently 
sympathetic to Cavell’s position may argue that not much light is shed by Cavell’s 
observation that criteria are criteria for something’s being so rather than for its 
being so. They will worry, then, that my candidate connections among elements 
in natural expressions look like old-fashioned conceptual connections between 
expressings and what they express. (For example, for something to be sorrow just 
is (in part) for weeping to be an appropriate expression of it. And for something to 
be weeping just is (in part) for it to be (rationally, not brutely) caused by sorrow.) 
And (the objection continues) these connections are either theoretically tractable, 
in which case they lead to reductive behaviorism; or they are not, in which case 
they are useless.
My proposal is indeed that there are conceptual connections among the ele-
ments in expressive packages. What is distinctive about my proposal is its claim 
about what the conceptual connection guarantees. I am not arguing that the con-
nections guarantee first- or third-person access to inner states. I am arguing that 
they guarantee that the phenomenon in question is a person-level one. I’ve claimed 
that the same connective structure, and the same pay-off, is at work in the case of 
demonstrative reference. Finally, this analogy helps someone who wants to see 
expressive connections as conceptual connections fend off the charge that she is 
aiming at an irrealist treatment of expressible mental states. The claim that there 
are tight connections between demonstrative phrase and referent isn’t usually in 
the service of any kind of irrealism about either.
B. ARGUMENTS FOR EXPRESSED- AND  
EXPRESSING-DEPENDENCE
Again, it is the second and third connections that require most explication. But here 
a preliminary clarification of the fourth connection is also needed. If a weeping 
person is sorrowing, her sorrow is the cause of her weeping, if only in the coun-
terfactual sense that had she not been sorrowing, she would not have wept.22 But 
this causal connection is not brutely causal.23 That is, weeping when sorrowing 
is appropriate, not just predictable. Sometimes the appropriateness can be cashed 
out like this: her sorrow is the weeping person’s reason for weeping, where her 
weeping is voluntary in the sense that she can affect the manner of her weeping, 
and how rapidly it is brought under control.24 Likewise with a kiss, though that is 
voluntary in an even stronger sense. For behaviors whose voluntary status is more 
tenuous, as crying is for at least some of us at times, the notion of appropriateness 
can still apply. Many such behaviors feel satisfying to the subjects in the states they 
express. So we might think of them as worth doing, even if we don’t feel ourselves 
to have a choice. (Think of efforts to reassure young boys that it is acceptable to cry, 
because crying makes you feel better.) I take it that someone who found nothing 
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plausible in either claim (1) or claim (4) is unlikely to want a positive account of 
expression.25 So I will focus on what support can be offered for connections (2) and 
(3). (The details of this support will also help flesh out the notion of appropriateness 
appealed to in unpacking claim (4).26)
Consider expressed-dependence first. It claims that an expressing depends 
on what it expresses for its status as a person-level phenomenon. In defending 
this claim, I will use Bar-On as a foil. Bar-On makes room for a weak version of 
expressed-dependence. She does so despite rejecting any conceptual connections 
between expressed states and expressings that would either conceptually guarantee 
the truth of avowals like “I’m so sad,” or court reductive behaviorism (Bar-On 
2004, 325). A comparison between claim (2) and Bar-On’s weaker connection will 
show that a fully satisfying account of expression requires something stronger than 
Bar-On takes herself to provide. It will also show such a stronger connection need 
not be grounded either in behaviorist irrealism about expressed states or in flatly 
constitutive approaches to first-person authority for expressions.27
The general motivation for Bar-On’s rejection of tight conceptual connections 
between expressions and expressed states is that she wants particular sentences or 
gestures to count as expressive products of a certain kind, even when they are put 
forward by insincere agents, or actors in a play. But Bar-On acknowledges that 
even with a firm distinction in place between acts (expressing one’s anger) and the 
products of acts (“You idiot!”), this move will seem troubling. That’s because she 
treats ‘express’ as a success verb.
The problem arises because Bar-On not only wants false avowals—e.g., an ut-
terance of “I’m so sorry” by someone who feels no regret—to count as expressive 
products. She wants agents’ production of them to count as expressive acts (2004, 
325–328). But there is a tension between counting an insincere utterance of “I’m 
so sorry” as an expressive act while construing ‘express’ as a success verb. Bar-On 
resolves it by finessing her commitment to disjunctivism in the philosophy of mind. 
She doesn’t emphasize that her position essentially depends on a tacit commitment 
to a conceptual connection between expressions and expressed states.
Disjunctivism is a cluster of views about perception, belief, and justification. It 
holds that if “a subject’s state can provide her with epistemic warrant for certain 
beliefs,” then when such candidate beliefs are false, the subject who holds them 
is not in the state that would have warranted them (though she may take herself 
to be) (2004, 391).28 For example, suppose a perception of a rat on a desk suf-
fices as warrant for the belief that there is a rat on that desk. If a subject believes 
falsely that there is a rat on her desk, then she was only under the impression that 
she was seeing a rat. There was no perception of a rat on a desk at all—only an 
apparent perception. Bar-On accepts disjunctivism about the states that warrant 
avowals. That is, she takes it that when avowing, and only then, “one’s epistemic 
warrant [is] the same as the rational cause of one’s behavior” (2004, 391; original 
in italics). A false belief that one is in pain is different from a true belief to this 
effect not only in its truth-value but in the agent’s entitlement to it. She is not in 
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the same mental state, though it may appear to her exactly like a case of her being 
in pain (392–393).
Now, Bar-On wants to accept this type of disjunctivism while counting as 
expressive even acts whose products do not truly ascribe states to their agents. 
So she needs some minimal way to unite both “acts of avowing truly and acts of 
avowing falsely” (2004, 395) as actions of a single kind it will be appropriate to call 
expressive. Her solution is to appeal to an interpreter’s perspective on the relevant 
acts. Bar-On explains that what unites acts of these two kinds is that “both are acts 
of speaking one’s mind whose characterization as reasonable acts may require 
mentioning the (possibly absent) self-ascribed states of mind.”29
According to the philosophy of action Bar-On accepts, it is not brute but rational 
causation that figures in the explanation of actions. We must be able to character-
ize an act as reasonable, at least in the sense of rationally intelligible, in order 
to characterize it as an act.30 This suggests that the uttering of a sentence is an 
act—and hence is appropriately interpreted by an audience as something a person 
did—only if the act is characterized in terms of its relation to an (appropriate) inner 
state. If so, the point covers all expressive acts. It isn’t just a tool for maintaining 
the expressive status of the performances of confused, insincere, or Equity-card-
holding agents. An interpreter’s appeal to an appropriate mental state is necessary 
to the characterization of all expressive acts as expressive acts.
A point drawn from the referential case will help to show why the point should 
be this general. Recall that on the playground, my friend, to understand me (by fully 
understanding what I said) needed to perceive Jane. And even to interpret me as at 
least trying to say something significant, she needs to describe me as attempting 
to communicate about a perceptible girl. Now, the audience to an expressive act 
perceives it as an act (a person-level production) only if they can advert to what it 
expresses. In cases where a successful expressing is fully appreciated by its audience, 
the audience can do this because they learn of (for example) sorrow by seeing weep-
ing, or by hearing an avowal of sorrow. In cases where someone is dissimulating, 
or where there is some kind of expressive failure, the audience can formulate the 
defeasible claim that the person is weeping (rather than e.g., that her tear-ducts are 
watering) only by reference to a state appropriately expressed with weeping, such 
as sorrow. This is akin to that interpretation that falls short of full understanding in 
the referential case. That is, it is a rationalizing strategy. Sorrow may be functioning 
only as a place-holder for some other state of a kind whose presence would keep the 
weeping at the person-level. In the fully successful case, the state to which we refer, 
in properly characterizing the relevant act, is also the rational cause of the act. But in 
every case, a behavior’s status as action depends on the possibility of adverting to an 
expressible state. To keep an expressing at the person-level, as something appropri-
ately described and explained in terms of its intelligibility, requires appeal to what 
the expressing expresses. But that just is what (2), expressed-dependence, asserts.31
Now consider expressing-dependence. It constrains how we may comply with 
expressed-dependence, as sense-dependence constrains how we may comply with 
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referent-dependence. In the referential case, the referent must be characterized in 
a manner that reflects the nature of the subject’s cognitive relation to it. Here, the 
expressed must be characterized in a way that respects the subject’s perspective 
on that state.
Note, first, that our expressive activity is often spontaneous, not epistemi-
cally mediated, and yet almost never surprises us. Second, and perhaps more 
controversially, we take successful expressive activity to get interpreters close to 
an expressing subject’s state, and her first-person perspective on that state. It gets 
them closer than either the issuing of (mere) reports or the performance of other 
non-expressive activity could do. The question of how expressive activity does 
this presumably waits on a particular positive account of expression. But the pos-
sibility of this closeness should be preserved by any positive account. Otherwise, 
expression wouldn’t turn out to be distinctive enough, compared to other methods 
of learning about our fellows, for us to give it the weight we do in our personal 
lives, or for us to hope an account of it will carry philosophical burdens. We could 
make room for this possibility of closeness if expressive activity were necessary 
to a proper characterization of what it expresses. We could also appeal to that 
necessity to explain our typical lack of surprise at our own (typically unplanned) 
expressive behavior.
Take an example of a non-natural, linguistic expression—such as an utter-
ance of “What a travesty!” in sorrowful disgust. Consider how expressed- and 
expressing-dependence look in this case. In any ordinary situation, it will be clear 
that the emergence of the phoneme-string corresponding to an utterance of “What 
a travesty!” was an intentional act. Nevertheless, an appeal to an expressed state is 
needed to characterize the utterance as an agent’s act in the following sense. Only 
by making such an appeal do we make the kind of interpretive move that could 
count, in the central cases, as understanding someone by fully understanding what 
she said. Only if the adverted-to state is present is the audience understanding the 
subject, engaging her on her own terms, by fully appreciating what she said. But 
only if some such state is adverted to will the audience be able to form hypotheses 
about what the subject might be up to, so that she can be seen as at least intending 
to be fully engageable.
Expressing-dependence looks easier to accept in the case of linguistic expres-
sions. Some philosophers, after all, have argued that to entertain beliefs—at least 
at any serious level of complexity—one must have the capacity to express those 
beliefs linguistically.32 And if an utterance could express a mental condition, the 
mental condition in question must have some tight ties to the content of the utter-
ance. Bar-On allows ties of this kind in the case of avowals and argues that they 
explain the presumption in favor of avowals’ truth (2004, 413–414). Someone who 
is bored, provided she speaks English, just is thereby in a position to (as Bar-On 
puts it) speak her mind, to express her being bored, by avowing, “I’m bored.” And 
here the expressing-dependence is clear because the expressive product contains 
the very concepts used to pick out the expressed condition.33
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But expressing-dependence is also present when subjects’ expressive activity 
is non-linguistic. In order for subjects to be rarely surprised by that activity, there 
has to be a distinctive connection between the activity and the state. Such a con-
nection is also required if interpreters are to be correct in taking expressive activ-
ity as more than a mere indication that the subject is in the relevant state. Since 
natural expressive activity isn’t semantically contentful, it won’t connect to what 
it expresses by naming it. But a feature of that connection carries over to this case. 
The expressing activity serves as a guide to the expressing subject’s take on the 
state she’s in. An interpreter who follows this guide will be able to respect that take 
when he attributes a mental state to her. This preserves the possibility that in his 
third-person approach, he is appreciating what it is like for the subject herself to be 
in the relevant state. Interpreters need to classify an expressed state so as to reflect 
the fact that a subject in that state is poised to express it as she does. Interpreters 
fulfill this requirement in different ways, however, depending on whether or not a 
subject’s expressing is linguistic.
The analogy with the use of demonstratives is exact. There, being able to repre-
sent a subject as making a determinate utterance required us to grasp how she was 
in fact connected to the referent of her demonstrative utterance. Here, being able 
to construe a subject as in a determinate state requires us to have a grip on how she 
actually is in the state she’s in. And ‘how she is’ is expressing, or poised to express, 
her state in this way (e.g., by weeping). So the full interpretation of the subject 
as in a definite state, rather than as in some-plausible-state-or-other, requires that 
one keep the expressing in the package as part of how one specifies the expressed.
Even when a state like sorrow has a relatively narrow range of canonical expres-
sions, it is possible for a behavior not in that set to count as an expression of the state. 
And it is possible to be surprised by the way another person, or, in special cases, 
one’s own self, expresses a state like sorrow. Acknowledging expressing-dependence 
doesn’t require us to ignore these complexities. But it means that when one realizes 
that some unusual behavior really is expressive of sorrow, one learns something 
about sorrow, and not only something about the sorrowing person before one.
For expressive activity to count as person-level, and for it to make possible full 
engagement with expressing subjects, we need to respect expressed- and expressing-
dependence in our approach to expressive wholes. It remains to be seen whether 
a slide into behaviorism is a necessary consequence of this approach. I will again 
use Bar-On as a foil, in arguing that it is not. The argument will also generate ad-
ditional support for expressing-dependence.
C. TIGHT CONNECTIONS DO DOT ENTAIL BEHAVIORISM
Bar-On is most clear that the connections her account makes between mental states 
and expressive behavior are minimal when she is defending herself against the 
charge that her account makes those connections too tight (2004, 421–424). Bar-On 
asserts that while she thinks expressive relations are distinctive, and “expressive 
behavior is sufficient to show the state it expresses” (421), expressive behavior is 
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neither necessary to nor sufficient for a subject’s being in an expressible state.34 
She puts the point very strongly:
The only commitment regarding a connection between mentality and behav-
ior that [my] account incurs is through the claim that mental states, unlike 
non-mental bodily states and psychological dispositions and traits, can be 
and often are shown (and made perceptible) through subjects’ behavior. 
(422; first emphasis added)
Bar-On acknowledges that “if the expressive behavior you’re witnessing can 
suffice to let you see my being in M [where M is some mental state], the behavior 
must in some sense be part of my being in M” (422). But this kind of part-whole 
relation is not a constitutive one, Bar-On insists. Specifically, “this does not mean 
that for any given M there will be characteristic expressive behavior that is es-
sential to being in M” (ibid.).35 Bar-On’s account of self-knowledge attempts to 
make do with only a negative characterization of expression. But her appeal to 
‘characteristic’ here comes from her sympathetic exploration of a positive ac-
count of expression in terms of showing that draws on Mitchell Green’s work. 
Green suggests that expressive behavior can make what it expresses perceptible if 
the behavior is a characteristic component of the expressed state (2007, 86–87).36 
This approach is in the background when Bar-On contrasts the characteristic and 
the constitutive. As she explains, “I can see the tree in my yard by seeing one of 
its familiar branches, which is clearly part of the tree. Still, the branch is not an 
essential part of the tree” (ibid.).
The analogy is revealing because of a difference between the tree case and 
expressive wholes as Bar-On officially construes them. True, no single branch 
is essential to the tree—not to its existence, not to its being a tree, and not to its 
being the particular tree that it is. (And a branch can still be a branch, when it lies 
severed on the ground.) But if a perception of a single branch does suffice for a 
perception of a tree, that tree must have an organic unity in which that branch 
participates. Characteristic components can’t enable perception unless some real 
unity, appropriate to the kind of object or state in question, connects them to that 
of which they are components. What is needed in the case of human expressive 
behavior is something to play the role of the organic unity of the tree—something 
that unites weeping and sorrow so that one can see sorrow by seeing weeping, even 
though that very person could have been in sorrow and not wept. Without it, there 
is no warrant for taking the perception of weeping to be, in the right sort of case, 
the perception of a person’s feeling sorrow.
Bar-On doesn’t put forward an account of a relevant personal unity. But expres-
sive activities won’t count as characteristic components of expressed states unless 
there is, for each of us, a serious unity of our minds and our bodies, our feelings 
and our gestures, our passions and beliefs and words. The unity must include both 
instinctual and acquired reactions, and both non-verbal and linguistic express-
ings. Only then would it be possible to see someone’s being afraid by seeing her 
shrinking posture, or hear someone’s being furious by hearing her say, “You are 
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lower than low!” That kind of unity is presumably itself acquired and developed, 
at least in part. We aren’t, at birth, able to have states that “What blasphemy!” ap-
propriately expresses.
We are eventually able to be in such states, and arguably do eventually display 
a unity of mind and acts, including speech-acts. A plausibly non-mysterious form 
of that unity will depend heavily on the unifying force a person’s perspective on 
her self and her world brings to her states and her actions. But any position ap-
pealing to that unity will end up entailing some version of expressed-dependence 
and expressing-dependence. That’s because caring about a subject’s perspective in 
the relevant way just is to take the paradigm form of understanding a person to be: 
interpreting her as engaged in determinate activity, not just in some-reasonable-
activity-or-other. That form of understanding requires us to foreground the perspec-
tive of those whom we interpret in a way that entails expressed-dependence and 
expressing-dependence.
So if Bar-On were to develop fully her suggestive line on expression as sufficient 
to enable the perception of what it expresses, she would end up with a positive ac-
count of expression that fit the template outlined here. Of course, she could decline 
to accept the kind of tight connections between elements in expressive wholes that 
the template lays out. But then she would run the risk of losing real distinctive-
ness for expressive connections. In any case, the tight connections laid out in the 
template do not entail a behaviorism of the kind Bar-On was concerned to avoid. 
When characterizing a behavior as a person’s determinate action, we need to refer 
to an expressed mental state. But that doesn’t make that action a guarantee of the 
presence of that state. And when we characterize a subject’s expressible state, we 
need to respect her point of view on it, and so we need to acknowledge that she is 
disposed to express that state as she does. But that doesn’t reduce the state to the 
disposition to produce such an expressing.
However, because Bar-On believes she can account for the distinctive status of 
avowals with only a negative account of expression, she herself does not present 
a fully fleshed-out account of expression as showing. In her provisional presenta-
tion of such an account, she explores the possibility that all expressive showing is 
perception-enabling. Mitchell Green, who does put forward a complete positive ac-
count of expression as showing, explicitly denies this. For Green, some expressings 
show what they express without enabling its perception.37 But like Bar-On, Green 
faces the problem of delineating exactly which showings are expressive, since not 
all are. He limits what can be expressed by stipulating that only introspectible states 
of subjects can be expressively shown (2007, 39).38 I will endorse a version of this 
position. He also limits expressive behaviors to those that show an introspectible 
state and are designed to show it. Expressive behaviors, according to Green, have 
to be signals: features that not only convey information but were designed for their 
ability to convey that information.39 I will argue that this limitation wrongly rules 
out, as not expressive, some behaviors that enable perception of emotional states. 
Green has a number of reasons for his design requirement. The connection it allows 
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him to make between expression and communication is especially significant, but 
the connection can be secured in another way. The resultant account of expressive 
showing would fit the template laid out above.
D. GREEN’S POSITIVE ACCOUNT OF  
EXPRESSION AS SHOWING
Many expressions of emotions, on Green’s view, enable the perception of those emo-
tions.40 Green holds that certain emotional states have, as characteristic components, 
distinctive facial signatures, physiological responses, and dispositions to (specific) 
behaviors (2007, 88, 91–92, 134). For example, “being angry at someone just is, 
inter alia, to want to hit or otherwise harm them” (127). So if I slap Smith, my slap 
shows my disposition to injure him, and hence makes my anger perceptible.41 If a 
behavioral disposition or an urge is a characteristic component of an emotion, then 
a manifestation of the disposition, or an action that satisfies the urge, will show that 
characteristic component. That will enable the perception of the relevant emotion. 
Green notes that one can show one’s emotion without aiming to do so. When angry 
at Smith, I may slap him just to satisfy the urge to injure. Likewise, I might show 
affection by embracing someone without aiming to show my affection, to her or 
anyone. I might simply feel like embracing her.42
Bar-On could count the slap and the hug as expressive, on her version of the 
characteristic component model, simply because they do show anger and affection 
(respectively). Green, however, counts them as expressive only because they also 
satisfy his design requirement. Slapping Smith, or even gouging out the eyes in 
a picture of him, do enable perception of anger. They are, respectively, actual or 
in-imagination satisfactions of urges that are characteristic components of anger. 
They count as expressive because, in addition to showing anger, they are designed 
to show anger. The actions aren’t designed by the slapper or the gouger to do this. 
Green asserts, however, that injuring X, making as if to injure X, or attacking 
something strongly affiliated with X, are all signals of anger at X.43 Whether the 
design is biological, cultural, or a mixture of both need not be settled (2007, 37). 
What matters is simply the fact of design. Green doesn’t explicitly discuss the 
designed status of embraces. But they also look like plausible candidates for signal 
status. I can employ whatever style of embrace is common in my culture simply 
to satisfy an urge to be close to someone I love, and hence without any intention 
on my part to show my affection. But that action nevertheless seems to have been 
designed (biologically and/or culturally) to show affection (to its recipient and/or 
to observers).
It may be that many characteristic components likewise turn out to be signals. 
(Facial expressions are a clear case of this that Green discusses.) But Green is com-
mitted to withdrawing the status “expressive” from any behavior, even a behavior 
that is a characteristic component of an expressible state, that turns out not to be 
designed to show the relevant state (2007, 27 and 142–143). And whether some 
behavior is designed, biologically or culturally, is an empirical question. Common 
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sense could be wrong about what it counts as expressive, because it could be wrong 
about the designed status of various behaviors (27).44
There are some behaviors that look as if they would count as expressive on 
Bar-On’s characteristic component account, but which are likely to fail the design 
test. Consider, for example, snuffling in the hair of a loved one, perhaps while she 
sits on your lap (if she is a child), or while you lie next to her (if she is a romantic 
partner). This can be done without any intention to communicate affection. For 
example, I sometimes curl over my sleeping daughter to do this, and there is no 
one else with me as I check on her in her bedroom. I do it simply because I like 
breathing her scent, and feeling the warmth of her scalp. The action immediately 
satisfies a desire for a certain kind of closeness, which desire is a characteristic 
component of affection (or, perhaps, affection of a certain kind—parental or ro-
mantic). A suitably placed observer could perceive my affection for my daughter by 
perceiving my burying my face in her hair, or by perceiving the way I do this. Green 
can’t grant my behavior expressive status, however, except by making a tentative 
judgment that it is designed (though not by me) to show affection. This judgment 
looks less plausible than it did in the case of embraces. Yet when I have seen other 
family members do this to my daughter, I intuitively treat it as expressive of their 
affection, just as I treat their embraces of her on other occasions.
Faced with such cases, Green has three options. He could say our intuitions 
were wrong: not all the behavior we pre-theoretically class as expressive turns out 
to be expressive. Or he could find a plausible design story for some such cases. 
Finally, he could argue that any action that immediately satisfies an urge that is a 
characteristic component of an expressible state is in fact designed to show that 
state. So all kinds of slaps and all kinds of caresses turn out to signal anger and af-
fection, respectively. (And so on for every relevant triad of action, urge, and state.) 
But while this last option might not over-broaden the category of expression, it 
surely risks watering down the concept of design.45 Presumably, then, Green would 
stick to the claim that a specific behavior counts as expressive only if it was itself 
specifically designed to show what it does. Thus, even when we have a behavior that 
is showing an emotion, and is even sufficient to show because it is a characteristic 
component of what it shows, its status as expressive is not secure until it has been 
proven to be a signal. In taking this route, Green might try to mitigate the number 
of cases where a loss of expressive status looms. He could suggest that many of 
these showing behaviors come bundled with other behaviors (such as facial expres-
sions) that are signals. So while snuffling in a child’s hair won’t express love for 
her, the repertoire of behaviors in which it is usually embedded will include clearly 
expressive ones. So the typical hair-snuffling parent will be expressing love while 
hair-snuffling, but not by hair-snuffling.
To keep the snuffling expressive, we need not dispute whether it is a signal. We 
could dispute Green’s contention that common sense links expressivity and design. 
Green makes this link fully explicit as follows: “To the extent that we take an item 
(behavior, artifact, etc.) as expressive, rather than just as indicative, of a state of 
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affairs, to that extent we also take it as having been designed (consciously or not) 
for the purpose of showing that state of affairs” (2008, 393).46 On this analysis of 
the notion of expressivity, we are all committed to withdrawing the label ‘expres-
sive’ from behavior that turns out not be designed to show what it does, whenever 
our views about designed status turned out to be incorrect. Green is right that we 
can’t settle what is designed simply by consulting folk-biological intuitions about 
what behaviors are expressive. He goes wrong in taking there to be a link between 
folk intuitions about expressivity and folk intuitions about design. Such largely 
conceptual disputes are notoriously difficult to adjudicate. I won’t argue directly that 
our ordinary notion of expression—the one that plays a significant role in our lives 
together—lacks any conceptual connection to design-status. Instead, I will show 
that two benefits of imposing the design requirement can be secured in other ways. 
The category of specifically expressive showings can be delineated without it. And 
the communicative success of expressive exchanges can be respected in its absence.
Before considering these two claims in turn, a clarification is in order. Green 
locates human expressivity in the context of an evolutionary account of expressive 
behaviors, including facial expressions, that are (Green argues) also deployed by 
non-human primates to expressive effect. But severing the conceptual link between 
being expressive and being designed has no implication for how many expressive 
behaviors are in fact designed to show what they express. It would not pre-judge 
questions about how our capacity to communicate evolved. It is also compatible 
with the possibility that we only managed to develop conventional signals because 
we were endowed with a rich repertoire of natural ones. We can deny that express-
ings must be designed to show what they express without challenging empirically 
grounded approaches to the origins and structure of communication.
Now consider the first claim: that the design requirement is not needed to iden-
tify expressive showings. Recall that Green (properly) counts as expressive some 
behaviors that are not intended by behaving subjects to show what they do.47 But 
rejecting an intention requirement—as Bar-On also does—means one cannot appeal 
to the absence of such intentions to explain why we intuitively deny expressive status 
to certain behaviors, like blushes and galvanic skin responses, that may very well 
show a subject’s mental state.48 Such behaviors cause Green particular trouble. On 
his “affect program” approach to emotions, undergoing various autonomic nervous 
system changes is part of what it is to be in a particular emotional state. If such 
changes are perceptible—as blushing clearly is—then they look like good candidates 
for characteristic components of the relevant emotion. Suppose Green had allowed 
characteristic-component-based perception-enabling showing (of introspectable 
states) to suffice for expressivity. Green would then, counter-intuitively, have to 
count these emotion-components as expressive behaviors. Because of his additional 
design requirement, he is able to rule these changes out as non-expressive, because 
neither appears to have been designed to show the emotions it partially comprises. 
(Given his own commitments, he’d have to rule either behavior back in if it turned 
out to have been so designed.49)
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Here is an alternative way to rule out galvanic skin responses, and possibly 
blushing. Consider whether or not the candidate expressive behavior is accessible 
to the subject first-personally. Perhaps this access is via proprioception. Or perhaps 
the behavior is a voluntary action and hence something the subject can be aware of 
in the non-observational way we are aware of our actions.50 If not, it isn’t expres-
sive. That rules out galvanic skin responses, and leaves blushing where, perhaps, it 
ought to be. Blushing is a behavior we aren’t sure how to classify, in part because 
people subject to blushing differ in the extent to which they describe it as some-
thing they can modulate, or as a sensation they can distinguish from the sensation 
of having a flushed face after exercise. Importantly, the first-person accessibility 
requirement is a counterfactual requirement. That is, we can express an emotion 
by an expressive activity of which we are not aware at the time of expression. 
Depending on how one’s attention is directed, one can sometimes, in the grip of a 
profound emotion, fail to realize initially that one is weeping, or screaming.51 But 
both are behaviors that one can know of in a first-personal way. My alternative to 
Green’s design requirement is as follows: to the extent that we take some behavior 
as expressive, to that extent we take it to be a behavior of which a subject can be 
first-personally aware.
Note that in the explicit statement quoted above, distinguishing expressivity from 
mere indication, Green is talking about expression in the most general sense. For 
him, this includes not only perception-enabling showing, but also certain showings-
that and showings-how. And it includes not only self-expression—the expression 
of introspectible states by subjects in those states—but expression in even the 
aesthetic sense (as when a heavy-looking statue expresses dejection).52 Obviously, 
the features that are candidates for expressive status in art works are not knowable 
first-personally, because they are not features of subjects. Suppose Green is right that 
there is a uniform notion of expression in play across aesthetic and self-expressive 
contexts. Even so, design need not be an independent requirement on expressive 
items. Note that if expressive showing is not of the perception-enabling kind, suc-
cessful showing appears to require design. Any artifact that shows an emotional 
state will have been designed to show something. (Artworks can express states their 
creators didn’t design them to express. But the work would not exist, and hence 
would not express all that it does, unless the artist had designed it to show some of 
what it does.) The connection is even tighter with any human behavior that shows 
without enabling perception of what it expresses—as with utterances, on Green’s 
account of them. If my utterance could suffice to show you that (for example) I 
intend to pick you up at the airport, it must have been designed to do so.53 Many 
means of expression are able to express what they do only because they are in fact 
signals.54 But this can be acknowledged without requiring all expressive means 
to be signals. We could lift the design requirement and sort perception-enabling 
showings by means of the first-person accessibility requirement. This would be 
compatible with acknowledging that in many contexts, a behavior or feature will 
manage to show, and hence express, only because it is designed to do so.
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Consider, now, the second benefit of the design requirement: it serves to keep 
expression in focus as a communicative phenomenon. It is significant that much of 
our expressive behavior is actually taken by others to express what it does. While 
one can express when all alone, observers—when there are some—usually and 
readily appreciate what one expresses. This is one of the reasons why we value 
expressivity: it helps us feel in touch with each other. A positive account of expres-
sion ought to respect this, if not explain it. One method for doing this is closed 
to Green, because he denies that expressive activity need be intended by its agent 
to be expressive. He can’t, therefore, try to explain the typical success of expres-
sive behavior by suggesting that expressing agents design it to be understood as 
expressive by their audiences. But if expressive behavior could be designed for 
audience appreciation by something other than the expressing subject, we’d have 
a link between expressive activities and their usual audiences. Something that is 
designed to show is going to be designed to show to some possible audience. (Of 
course, an instance of showing may occur even if no actual member of that audi-
ence appreciates the showing.) But requiring expressings to be designed is not the 
only way to respect the communicative success of much of our expressive behavior.
Suppose the typical consumers of expressive behavior are designed, perhaps 
sometimes in the sense of trained, to perceive expressive behavior as expressing 
what it does. This would go a great distance toward explaining the extent of our 
communicative success. Consider again actions that are characteristic components 
of particular emotions, or are manifestations or satisfactions of dispositions that 
are characteristic components of those emotions. It is not in dispute that someone 
can engage in those actions, and thus show her emotions, even if her only reason 
for doing so is the satisfaction this brings to someone in the relevant emotional 
state. Take, for example, actions that have a good claim to being natural, rather 
than conventional, characteristic components of fear: crouching, throwing up one’s 
arms to cover one’s face, or holding one’s own torso while cringing away from 
the object of the fear. We perceive those as fearful postures.55 It is useful to us as a 
species that fear can be communicated in this way. We often face common threats, 
and the more rapidly more of us can take action to avoid them, the better. It is also 
sometimes useful for the object of our fear to be shown our fear. Suppose, that is, 
the object of our fear is a human threatening to strike us, rather than some falling 
rocks. In such a case, it is useful for that human to realize we pose no kind of threat 
and can safely be left alone; or, in more socially loaded contexts, that we already 
“know our place” and don’t need to be forcibly reminded of it. But these practical 
benefits can be secured without the fearful postures themselves being designed to 
show fear. The benefits could be secured if we are designed to see them as fearful.
Any design here is presumably biological.56 But socialization might encourage 
us, more or less explicitly, to perceive a wide variety of behaviors as expressive. 
Perhaps reminders about which dispositions and states go together help develop 
our capacity to appreciate certain perception-enabling showings. We are under 
social pressure to be attentive, and perhaps in responding to this pressure, we get 
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better at seeing certain behaviors as characteristic components of expressed states 
(or as manifestations of those components.) Defending any particular claim about 
consumer-side design would, obviously, be an empirical affair.57 My general point 
is only that we can lift the design requirement for expressive behaviors without 
denying that it is often useful for our emotions to be shown, and without denying 
that they are often shown successfully to our fellows. Expression is in general apt 
for audience appreciation. But even when that aptness is the result of design, what 
has been designed may be the typical consumer of an expressive behavior, rather 
than the produced behavior itself.
E. EXPRESSING-DEPENDENCE AND  
EXPRESSED-DEPENDENCE, REVISITED
Rejecting a conceptual link between expressivity and designedness drastically alters 
Green’s account of expression.58 But it lets us extend Green’s account of perception-
enabling expressive showing to behaviors commonly treated as expressive, such as 
certain kinds of caresses and crouches. In the preceding section, I showed that even 
with this alteration, we could rule out non-expressive showings by introducing a 
first-person accessibility requirement for expressive behaviors. And I showed that 
audience design is an alternative explanation of the fact that we properly appreciate 
much of our fellows’ expressive behavior. In this section, I show that the resultant 
positive account of expression fits the template developed in this paper.
This account will trace rational and causal links among the elements in expres-
sive wholes. First, the introspectibility requirement ensures that expressed states are 
not without cognitive significance to subjects. Second, much expressive behavior 
is voluntary, even if it is not undertaken with an intention to express. Such behav-
ior—ranging from speech-acts to dance performances—will clearly be person-
level behavior. Where the behavior looks less voluntary, it will still be cognitively 
significant to the agent if it satisfies the first-person accessibility requirement. If 
someone is so enraged that she could not have prevented herself from slapping 
the target of her rage, she is still first-personally aware of her slapping. And the 
satisfaction the slap gives is her satisfaction: the relation between the urge to injure 
and the satisfying action is person-level. Likewise for weeping in sorrow or scream-
ing in pain: while these may be involuntary, they are first-personally accessible. 
Sometimes the person in pain has an urge to weep or scream, and again, the sense 
of the fulfillment of that urge is person-level and immediate. The less any of these 
person-level connections hold of some behavior, the less it will count as expressive.59 
Green’s account of self-expression already put such connections in place for much 
expressive behavior. Adding the first-person accessibility requirement for expres-
sive behavior highlights the presence of these connections in natural expressions, 
and rules out as non-expressive any behavior that lacks them.
The modified account also includes a version of expressed-dependence. First, 
an account of expression that depends on the notion of a characteristic component 
requires a unity between those components and the states they express (by showing). 
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The earlier discussion of Bar-On showed that securing such unity also secures 
some version of expressed-dependence.60 Unlike Bar-On, however, Green explicitly 
denies that all expression is of the perception-enabling variety. However, a version 
of expressed-dependence is also embedded in his account of the self-expression 
that is based on showing-that. On his account, subjects express their beliefs and 
desires by exploiting conventions to show that they have those beliefs and desires. 
The conventions are associated with norms making subjects liable to loss of cred-
ibility if they turn out not to have the beliefs and desires in question. (Since losing 
credibility, and hence the ability to participate in important conversational spaces, 
is a serious threat, faking compliance with the norms carries real risk.) But those 
norms make sense-level connections between the relevant states and the acts 
that express them.61 The connections amount to expressed-dependence because 
interpreters must refer to the expressed state when interpreting the sounds coming 
from a speaker’s mouth as a person-level performance. Otherwise making those 
sounds can’t be interpreted as an act of making oneself liable to certain penalties, 
and hence as an act of determinate self-expression.
The modified version of Green’s account also includes expressing-dependence. 
Recall that expressing-dependence is a way of respecting expressed-dependence 
properly. We can only interpret an expressing subject as doing something deter-
minate if we pick out the state she’s expressing in a way that is sensitive to her 
take on that state, her way of being in it. By stipulating that expressible states be 
introspectible, Green has already made a significant move in this direction. He 
acknowledges that a state that can be known by introspection may, perhaps, be 
knowable in other ways (such as a third-personal, neuro-physiological way).62 The 
requirement is only that an expressible state must have at least one introspective way 
of being known. If one is characterizing a state as part of an expressive whole, then 
specifications of that state will need to fit the way the state is known in introspec-
tion. (Or: they will need to fit the way the state could be known in introspection (if 
the subject has yet to shift her attention to it).) Linking the specification of what is 
expressed to the subject’s (also first-personally knowable) expressive activity is a 
simple way to do that. It ensures that expressed states are specified so as to make 
clear that they can meet the introspectibility requirement.
The discussion above noted that expressing-dependence looks easier to secure 
in the case of linguistic expressions, both generally and for Bar-On’s account in 
particular. And this is true for the modified version of Green’s account as well. 
When a subject does express her state linguistically (whether via an explicit self-
ascription or not), using the content of her utterance to guide our specification of the 
state she expresses ensures that expressed-dependence is respected in the right way. 
It ensures that the expressed is specified as cognitively significant to the subject.
But expressing-dependence, and its determination of how to satisfy expressed-
dependence, extends more broadly once Green’s account is modified. With the 
first-person accessibility requirement in place, picking out behavior as expressive 
requires tracking the subject’s own mode of awareness of it. Classifying behavior as 
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smiling, rather than as (say) the tightening of certain facial muscles, gets an inter-
preter to the way the expressing subject specifies her own behavior, if she does. At 
the very least, it yields a view of that behavior as a target of a subject’s distinctive 
awareness. Either way, the interpreter has made contact with the subject’s take on 
some aspect of the expressive whole. And that take can be used to guide how we 
specify the other main aspect of that whole—the expressed state. It helps guide us 
to a specification of the expressing subject’s state on which it will be clear that she 
is in a determinate state, and clear that the state is cognitively significant.
This does not prove that the only proper way to respect expressed-dependence 
(and the introspectibility requirement) is to be guided by expressing behavior. But 
it does show that the simplest way to develop the modified account relies on such 
guidance, to a degree that secures expressing-dependence. So the modified version 
of Green’s account, on the simplest plan for its development, fits the template. 
Recapping what drove the modification will show the significance of this.
Green counts urges—like the urge to injure—as characteristic components of 
common emotions. But his design requirement rules out, as not expressive, some 
actions that immediately satisfy such urges. Rejecting the design requirement, and 
declining to re-introduce the intention-to-express requirement, left us in search of 
another way to rule out, as non-expressive, such showings of emotional states as 
galvanic skin responses. The requirement that expressive activity be first-personally 
accessible was introduced as an alternative. As a result, expressing-dependence 
turns out to cover even non-linguistic expressions. (Expressed-dependence follows 
easily from the account’s reliance on characteristic components and conventions.) 
Of course, some yet-to-be-developed account could fail to fit the template while 
managing to treat hair-snuffling and crouching, but not galvanic skin changes, as 
expressive. Nothing argued here rules out that possibility. But Bar-On and Green 
have demonstrated how much can be accomplished by treating expression as 
showing. That makes some version of that treatment look like our best bet for a 
positive account. Any version of that account will need to sort expressive from 
non-expressive showings. Using the design requirement to do so excludes too 
many behaviors that enable perception of emotions. Substituting the first-person 
accessibility requirement on expressive behavior, however, results in an account 
that fits the template. So if we modify the attractive account of expression as show-
ing to fit our intuitions about caresses and crouches, we will have an account that 
fits the template.
IV. CONCLUSION
Analogies of four connections distinctive of successful communication with de-
monstratives are found in cases of expression. In both cases, the connections serve 
to guarantee that the states and behaviors they connect are states and behaviors 
of persons. We avoid mystification because we can trace out the specific roles 
expressing-dependence and expressed-dependence play in our interpretation of 
individual expressive behaviors. And we avoid behaviorism. While there may be 
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reference-level connections between expressed states and expressive behavior in 
some particular cases, the connections at issue in the template are sense-level. 
They concern what is needed to interpret our fellows as in determinate states, do-
ing determinate things.
Both the general template and the modified account of expression-as-showing, 
put forward in response to Green, rely on the notion of personhood. The template 
makes use of the idea of person-level engagement, of approaches to others that 
depend on viewing them as capable of rational motivation. And the modified ver-
sion of Green’s account implicates personhood in two ways. The introspection 
requirement for expressed states presumes some account of the distinction between 
introspection and other ways of knowing of an individual’s states. And the first-
person accessibility requirement presumes we can distinguish various ways of 
knowing of one’s own behavior, and single out those ways that no one but oneself 
can use. Accepting the template does mean there will be a somewhat tight circle 
between analyses of expression and analyses of personhood.
But this regiments, and helps explain, facts on the ground. Analyses of expression 
and of first-person authority already take in each other’s washing. Green appeals 
to introspection in accounting for person-level expression (as opposed to artistic 
expressivity). Finkelstein appeals to expression in accounting for first-person author-
ity and the distinction between conscious and unconscious mental states. Bar-On 
appeals to expression to account for the secure status of some self-ascriptions. And 
she appeals to the claim that expression is a kind of showing to explain which self-
ascriptions count as secure. Bar-On apparently comes closest to breaking out of the 
circle. She suggests that expressive behavior is sufficient to show what it expresses, 
and that this sufficiency requirement can’t be met for states whose presence in a 
subject depends on facts beyond her control. Attention to sufficiency might let us 
pick out exactly the states we usually use ‘introspectible’ or ‘occurrently conscious’ 
to pick out, without relying on either notion. The account of expression could per-
haps then proceed without any reliance on first-person authority. But there are two 
problems with this. One is that such an approach excludes states we might wish to 
count as expressible, such as perceptual experience and knowledge.63 The other is 
that pursuing the sufficient-to-show line requires treating all expressive behavior 
as a characteristic component of what it expresses.64 As I’ve argued, that requires 
appeal to a kind of unity between expressed states and expressive behavior. That 
unity will be most easily secured when a subject’s own perspective on her states 
and behaviors is foregrounded in any account of either. But the relevant sense of 
‘own’ will bring back appeals to the distinctively first-personal.
None of this means that only negative accounts of expression are possible. But it 
suggests that positive accounts of expression will depend on accounts of distinctively 
first-personal modes of self-awareness. That shouldn’t be surprising. The concept of 
the expressive enables us to track the distinction between engaging with someone 
and merely coping with her, however competently and in interpretively sophisti-
cated ways. And it is in our dealings with persons where we take this distinction 
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to be serious. Persons expect to be engaged with and not merely managed. Such 
engagement requires the fit between the perspectives of expressing subject and 
interpreting audience that the connections laid out in the template would secure.65
ENDNOTES
1. Dummett 1981, especially chapter 3, “Was Frege a Philosopher of Language?” and 1991; 
Finkelstein 2003; and Bar-On 2004.
2. Bar-On 2004: 253 and 257–258. Bar-On is developing Gareth Evans’s (1982) account of 
immunity to error through misidentification, which itself expands on Sydney Shoemaker’s 
(1968) development of Wittgenstein’s distinction between different uses of ‘I’ (1958b).
3. Positions sympathetic to this worry play a role in the on-going debate over whether 
Wittgenstein’s notion of criterial connections helps illuminate expression.
4. The worry about a reductive form of behaviorism will be discussed in more detail be-
low, in connection with Bar-On’s concern to avoid certain behaviorist commitments. She 
is wary of any behaviorist commitment that would lead, in her view, to “an implausibly 
irrealist position in the philosophy of mind” (2004, 422). Of course, if its commitments 
were minimal, a non-reductive behaviorism might resemble, rather than threaten, some 
accounts of expression. Consider, for example, the commitments to avoiding metaphysical 
dualism and to allowing observed behavior to warrant third-person ascriptions of mental 
states. (Graham 2008 identifies minimal behaviorism with the adoption of just these two 
commitments.)
5. The interplay between conceptual and empirical questions will be discussed in more 
detail below, when considering Mitchell Green’s positive account of expression.
6. Jennifer Hornsby (2000) argues that this is how we should understand Dennett’s original 
distinction between the personal and sub-personal. Hornsby holds that person-level ex-
planation is distinctive for its construal of persons as agents whose motives are rationally 
assessable, and that this construal requires finding a pattern of distinctive intelligibility in 
their actions and reactions. One talks about someone at the person level by foregrounding 
the fact that she is a person. Not everything one says about her at that level will concern her 
voluntary actions. Her perceptual experiences and her beliefs are other examples of states 
properly accessed at the person level (see also Hornsby 1997). (For discussion of this with 
respect to perceptual experience, see McDowell 1998c.)
7. I will focus primarily on perceptually based demonstrative reference, a sub-class of 
demonstrative, and that of singular, reference. Some, but not all, of what I say would apply 
to the larger classes.
8. The argument of this paper relies on, but does not independently defend, the way of 
thinking of demonstrative reference and communication involving it that is laid out in Evans 
1982. See Campbell 2002 and 2006 for another articulation of, and reliance on, this view 
of communication with demonstratives. The success of such projects could provide both 
motivation and material for rigorous defenses of this view of demonstrative communication.
9. See Dummett 1981, 227 and Frege 1997, 156 on a word having a referent and expressing 
a sense.
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10. Certainly, some kind of understanding can be achieved even when complete communi-
cative success is not. And this is true even in some cases of demonstrative reference where 
the hearer does not know to what the speaker has referred. A common way of regimenting 
what goes on in these cases is to distinguish (following Kaplan 1989) between the charac-
ter and content of demonstratives. Gareth Evans, on whose work I’m drawing, objected to 
this sort of regimentation (1985, 302–306). The distinction between ‘understanding’ and 
‘full understanding’ allows me to track the cases I’m interested in without requiring me to 
defend either Evans’s view that all demonstrative sense is object-dependent, or his view that 
without such sense, there is nothing to understand in such cases. See Grush 2007 for useful 
explication.
11. The specific sensory modality by which she does so is not necessarily relevant, though 
it might be in some contexts. What is definitely ruled out is the use of a descriptive means 
of singling out Jane.
12. The relevant notion of possibility may be thin. For example, suppose that just as I utter 
my remark, Jane disappears down a tunnel slide, and we are forced to leave the playground 
before she emerges. My friend will not have the opportunity to understand my remark. But 
my utterance was understandable. And I believed its content.
13. On many theories of reference, the existence of the referent, while necessary to referential 
success, won’t be sufficient for success. For Evans, for example, the sense of the referring 
phrase must also provide the speaker with an identification of the referent (1982, 170–179).
14. Here too there will be cases where some understanding is achieved even by hearers who 
fail to appreciate fully what a speaker did. Perhaps they miss the illocutionary force of an 
utterance, or haven’t kept track of a conversational implication that is crucial to communica-
tion in this context. But whatever understanding they achieve won’t be the full understanding 
at issue in communicative success.
15. Compare Evans 1982, 71.
16. I’m assuming that content in general, and so that portion of a believed-content expressed 
with a demonstrative, is essentially tied to subjectivity. That is, content is essentially such 
as to be enjoyed by subjects, and not by, e.g., sub-personal parts of subjects. See McDowell 
1998a and Searle 1983. I would argue that Stich 1978 is making the same point.
17. The relations must be similar enough that each by itself can, in the context, provide the 
agent relating to Jane with the capacity to identify Jane demonstratively. In some contexts, 
it might be that a speaker and hearer using different perceptual modalities to perceive Jane 
nevertheless manage to have similar enough identifications of her for them to achieve full 
communicative success.
18. See, for example, the opening sections of Perry 2001. Perry is laying out different theories 
of reference. His botanization betrays his assumption that any identification of an object that 
is graspable in thought must be descriptive.
19. I’m borrowing the terminology, and the explanation of the distinction, from Brandom 
2002, 194–199.
20. For something closer to reference-level dependence, see the discussions below of Bar-
On’s and Green’s suggestion that some expressive behaviors are characteristic components 
of the mental states they express.
21. See Part I of Cavell 1979, which focuses mostly on Wittgenstein 1958a.
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22. This is compatible with the possibility that on some occasions, a mental state like sorrow 
could be the cause of its expression in a more robust sense. And it is also compatible with 
the possibility that an actress in a play with a funeral scene could weep without feeling any 
sorrow herself. Finally, note that Green explicitly allows that an emotion may cause the facial 
movements and behavioral dispositions that (on his view) partially constitute it (2007, 90).
23. The discussion here has been influenced by Bar-On’s handling of the relation between 
two distinctions (2004, 248–250). The first distinction is between rational and brute causa-
tion. The second is between a person expressing her state via an intentional action and a 
behavior expressing the state that causes it. Bar-On’s project doesn’t require her to find 
any positive similarity between these two kinds of expression. All she needs is a negative 
similarity: that in neither case is the expressive behavior dependent on the subject making 
an identification of what is expressed. She thinks it likely, however, that there are positive 
similarities.
24. For this expanded sense of the voluntary, as outrunning that which is preceded by a 
conscious decision, or that which can be done at will, see Bar-On 2004, 249 and Green 2007, 
28 and 122. Bar-On appears to treat as voluntary any of one’s behaviors one can modulate, 
while Green requires us to be able to prevent a behavior at its time of onset in order to call it 
voluntary. (This difference may not be significant, because there isn’t a bright line between 
complete prevention and modulation to the point of rapid suppression.) What behaviors are 
voluntary even in this expanded sense varies from person to person. The variation is sensi-
tive to cultural influences. And we can over- and under-estimate the degree to which certain 
behaviors are voluntary for us in this sense.
25. Mitchell Green might look like an apparent exception. I will discuss the connection 
between his account of expression and the idea of rational causation below.
26. How to treat behaviors that have causal relations to mental states, are not cognitively 
significant to their subjects, and are of questionable expressive status, is discussed below in 
connection with Green’s account.
27. Bar-On rejects any approach that makes one’s expression of a state wholly or partially 
constitutive of being in that state. I focus on one reason—her desire to preserve expres-
sive status for actors’ behaviors. But she also finds such approaches inapplicable to many 
phenomenal states and their avowals, and problematic for our accounts of the mental lives 
of human infants and some non-human animals. These last concerns pertain to accounts of 
self-knowledge that locate constitutive connections between “the nature and presence of first-
order mental states and the presence of correct self-ascriptive judgments” (Bar-On 2009, 60). 
According to Bar-On, a subject’s self-ascription, whether uttered audibly or not, counts as an 
expression. So these accounts of self-knowledge, while obviously not behaviorist, also make 
the constitutive links between mental states and their expressions that Bar-On rules out.
28. The quotation is from a paragraph in which Bar-On is endorsing disjunctivism and com-
paring her view of avowals’ warrants to the views laid out in McDowell 1998b. Disjunctivism 
about perceptual states plays a large role in McDowell 1996.
29. Bar-On 2004, 395; emphasis original. See also p. 403.
30. This may seem tendentious. Certainly, a behavior will need to be subject to assessment 
for (un)reasonableness in order to count as an act, but it need not in fact be reasonable. 
But in the passage on p. 395, Bar-On appears to mean ‘reasonable’ in the following sense: 
one could think of interpretations on which we would not have to condemn the agent of 
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irrationality. And that is quite close to the sense of ‘rationally assessable’ needed to distin-
guish acts from mere behaviors. A further clarification: the following paragraphs argue that 
Bar-On is committed to expressed-dependence. Following Bar-On, they focus on behaviors 
that are clearly voluntary (avowals, but also exclamations like, “That hurts!”). Discussion 
of expressed-dependence for behaviors whose voluntary status is more equivocal comes in 
the next section, and in the section below devoted to Green’s account.
31. So when it is put in appropriate form, the particular sense-level connection that Bar-On 
allows between expressings and expressed states amounts to expressed-dependence. When 
this is highlighted, we see an example of a very strong conceptual connection that is nev-
ertheless distinct from the constitutive conceptual connections Bar-On rejects. We also see 
that Bar-On’s claim that her account makes only one kind of connection between mental 
states and expressive behavior is not correct (2004, 422; the passage is quoted and discussed 
in the next section.)
32. See Davidson 1984. Bar-On remains agnostic on the point, but argues that her account 
doesn’t require her to insist that beliefs have non-linguistic expressions. All that matters is 
that they have non-self-ascriptive expressions, which can be replaced by avowals (at least 
some of the time, by the “seasoned speaker”) (2004, 294).
33. Again, it matters that this is a sense-level connection. David Finkelstein’s (2003) claim 
that expressions contextualize, and so partially constitute, expressed states, is perhaps a 
reference-level version of expressing-dependence. In generalizing expressing-dependence 
(in the remainder of this section and the next), I am continuing to construe it as a sense-
level relation. If the characteristic component accounts I will discuss below are true, then 
there are also reference-level expressing-dependencies. If so, those would be reference-level 
dependencies that weren’t constitutive dependencies.
34. Bar-On distinguishes non-expressive from expressive showings by arguing that the 
latter are sufficient to show what they express. For the purposes of comparing Bar-On and 
Green, it could be useful to think of Bar-On’s notion of ‘sufficient to show’ as matching 
Green’s notion of ‘showing,’ and often his notion of perception-enabling showing. What 
Bar-On labels ‘showing’—such as my drawing up a sleeve to reveal the skin that shows my 
sunburn—could perhaps be thought of as ‘helps to show.’
35. Note that this formulation doesn’t clearly rule out the possibility that the expressive 
behavior has a tight sense-level connection to the concept of that particular mental state.
36. Green proposes the following usage for ‘characteristic component’: “Let a be an object, 
event, or process that is perceptible. Then we may say that relative to an organism O and 
ecological situation E, a characteristic component of α is a part of α that, when perceived 
in E without any other part of α being perceived, enables O to perceive a” (87). Making 
characteristic component status relative to both observers and environments fits with Green’s 
inferentialist account of perception. A side of an apple is a characteristic component of an 
apple for a normal human perceiver in, say, a grocery store. Green claims that this “amounts 
to the fact that under normal conditions, perception of part of an apple’s surface is enough 
to justify [such a perceiver] in inferring (if only unconsciously) the existence of the entire 
apple” (86). But perceiving a one-micron-square segment of a skyscraper would not justify 
a normal human perceiver in inferring the existence of the building, so such segments are 
not characteristic components of skyscrapers for us. Like Bar-On, Green emphasizes that 
characteristic components can be conventional or atypical components. But he doesn’t give 
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a general account of what unifies components. Hence what justifies perceivers’ inferences 
remains unexplored.
37. Green distinguishes perception-enabling showings of objects or states from (non-
perceptual) showings-that something is the case, and showings-how something feels. Each 
kind of showing enables knowledge of what it shows.
38. Bar-On would agree that one cannot express what cannot be introspected. But she 
can’t rely on that point to delineate the scope of the expressive, because she’s trying to 
explicate self-knowledge in terms of expression. Such a stipulation would reverse her order 
of explanation.
39. I’m paraphrasing the definition of ‘signal’ provided in the Appendix (Green 2007, 212).
40. Green notes that “our commonsense patterns of thought and description of one another” 
count emotions as perceptible (2007, 91). He argues that we may follow the common view, 
as it is not incoherent (90–92). Treating emotions as perceptible allows him to consider what 
characteristic components might enable their perception.
41. I’ve lightly modified a case presented in Green 2007, 93.
42. Green notes that someone might hug a friend, aiming to display her care to that friend, 
but might also do so with no such aim in mind (2007, 33). And the same applies to “cases 
in which the target of one’s expression [e.g., a photograph one kisses] stands in as a prop 
for the object of one’s expressed state” (43).
43. Green presents a case where an angry person only makes as if to injure the target of her 
anger, by mutilating a photograph (2007, 37). And the explanation for why this counts as 
behavior designed to show is that “attacking something associated with an object of rage is a 
widely used signal of that rage” (ibid.). In another case where Green discusses making-as-if 
to satisfy an urge, he discusses making a shooting gesture at a colleague. And this gesture 
can show one’s annoyance, he says, because it partially satisfies the urge to injure which is 
a characteristic component of that emotion, a (mild) species of anger. He classes this as a 
case of expressing without explaining how the design requirement is satisfied. (Of course, 
if the person making the gesture intended it to show her anger, the design requirement is 
satisfied. But Green emphasizes that urge-satisfying actions may be done for no other reason 
than the satisfaction they provide.) I am assuming that attacking the target of one’s anger, 
and not only something affiliated with that target, could be a signal of anger. If Green would 
deny this, the case I present below is only strengthened. It isn’t a point in favor of his view 
if it can’t count direct attacks on others as expressions of anger at them.
44. See also Green 2008, 393; 2009, 145n9.
45. Here is the concern about over-broadening the category of expression. Without some 
careful work on what counts as satisfying an urge, almost any action provoked by an urge 
might come to count as expressive. But while a slap is typically counted as expressive of 
anger, mailing an anthrax-laced letter in delayed retaliation for a slight is not. Yet both satisfy 
the urge to injure, and both count as designed, if I am right that Green would count actual 
attacks on objects of rage as signals of rage (see note 43 above). So both count as expressive 
for Green.
46. Green implies the link when he first presents the design requirement in his 2007 book, 
but this paper makes clear that he does mean to be talking about our ordinary concept of 
expression. He’s not making a point that would apply only to a philosopher’s cleaned-up 
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version of it. Of course, he takes it that common sense is correct. The link between expres-
sivity and design isn’t, in his view, simply created by our common view of expression.
47. As discussed above, when an urge is a characteristic component of a mental state, I take 
an act that directly satisfies that urge to express that state, regardless of whether the agent 
of that action intended it to do so. Therefore, like Bar-On and Green, I too must reject an 
intention requirement on expression. For this reason, I reject Wayne Davis’s analysis of 
expression, which makes the intention to indicate one’s mental state necessary to expression 
(see Davis 2003, chap 3; 2008a, 117–118; 2008b, 427–428). For more general arguments 
against this portion of Davis’s account of expression, see Green 2008. (Green also argues 
that indication is not sufficient for expression.) Note 59 below discusses Davis’s responses 
(2008a and 2008b) to Green’s criticisms.
48. I’m only discussing how the design-requirement works to whittle the perception-enabling 
showings down to the expressive ones. In principle, the design-requirement also delineates 
expressive showings-that and showings-how. But it will be less obvious that there are actual 
cases of agents showing their states in one of these ways without thereby expressing them. 
As discussed below, on Green’s own account, showing is often accomplished in these cases 
only by design.
49. For a sample of the active debate on this topic, see Dijk, de Jong, and Peters 2009, 
arguing that blushing is a signal, and Crozier 2004 articulating uncertainty about its signal 
status (while making a number of assumptions about the role of facial signals (such as their 
needing to be producible at will) that Green would dispute).
50. I’m assuming only that there is some such way, and that it is distinctively first-personal. 
Of course, that there is anything significant distinguishing first-personal and third-personal 
relations to one’s body, mental states, and actions is a serious assumption. But it is no more 
serious than the assumption Green makes in limiting expressible states to introspectible states. 
After all, introspection is only distinctive enough to do this limiting work if it is (in some 
way) distinctively first-personal. I’m suggesting Green broaden his introspectibility require-
ment, and use that broader notion of distinctive first-personality to limit not only what can be 
expressed but what can do expressive work. Embracing either requirement means incurring 
a commitment to give up expressive/expressing status for any state or behavior that turned 
out, on our eventual best theory of the first-personal, not to be knowable first-personally.
51. And one might be aware of some behavior, but not yet be aware of it as expressing what 
it does.
52. The template under consideration in this paper has immediate application only to ac-
counts of self-expression, or attempts at it, in Green’s sense of ‘self-expression.’
53. Green argues that speech acts can show that speakers have (for example) beliefs and 
intentions. Speech-acts signal the presence of such states in a way that makes a speaker li-
able to severe penalties if she does not in fact have the state she signals. (In making a speech 
act, one incurs certain (conventionally dictated) commitments, and risks losing credibility 
in the community if one fails to live up to them [Green 2007, 70–73; 2009, 152–155].) 
Green argues generally that handicaps—signals that are very costly to produce—show what 
they signal. On his handicap theory of speech acts, then, our speech acts express what they 
do because of how they signal what they do. In this case, designed-status is not a way of 
achieving expressivity after showing is achieved. The signaling is how the showing can be 
accomplished at all.
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54. Both of the models Green explores for counting showing-how as (knowledge-enabling) 
showing, and not mere indicating, also turn out to involve showing that is achieved via 
signaling (see the previous note) (2007, 186).
55. See de Gelder et al. 2004, finding that study subjects could perceive postures as fearful 
even when the faces of individuals in the target images were blanked out. And, while this is 
hardly decisive, it is interesting that de Gelder and colleagues call these postures “whole-
body expressions” of fear (16701, emphasis added). Green could allow that they show fear, 
but not that they express it—unless they all turned out to be signals of fear.
56. De Gelder and her colleagues found that subjects viewing fearful postures (as opposed to 
meaningful but emotionally neutral postures) had elevated activity in brain regions known to 
process emotional information, as well in regions “dedicated to action representation and in 
motor areas” (2004, 16702). They speculate that fear-perception may lead to fear-contagion, 
and perhaps to appropriate action-preparation (16705). Mechanisms for perceiving postures 
as fearful, and for generating appropriate responses, could be designed independently of the 
signal status of the postures.
57. One might begin to back up the socialization point by drawing on recent work on folk-
psychology. A number of theorists are now arguing that folk-psychology plays a large role 
in shaping us: it helps us hold one another to certain standards of cognitive and affective 
behavior, and increases individuals’ capacity to hold themselves to those standards. (See, for 
example, McGeer and Pettit 2002; McGeer 2007, and Zawidzki 2008). Being thus shaped, 
and getting good at continuing the shaping, might depend on basic abilities to perceive oth-
ers’ behavior as expressing what it does. And those abilities could get stronger, and expand 
to cover more kinds of behavior, over time.
58. Beyond recognition, Green might say. But I submit that the commonality most funda-
mental to his account is that all expression is showing and hence (for relevant observers) 
knowledge-enabling (see Green 2009, 143). Design is how behaviors that don’t initially 
appear capable of showing (rather than merely indicating) manage to show what they do.
59. Davis holds that a subject can express her mental state only with an action she intends 
as an indication of that state. Subjects can’t express their states with actions that aren’t 
intended as indications, and they can’t express their states with actions that aren’t intended 
at all (2008a, 117–118; 2008b, 427). Non-intended behaviors can express mental states 
in an evidential sense, but the subject whose behaviors they are is not expressing herself 
thereby. Davis argues that Green’s account of expression improperly treats some cases 
where a behavior evidentially expressed a state as cases where a subject expressed her 
state (via that behavior). Someone who thought expression was paradigmatically a person-
level phenomenon might think she had to accept Davis’s criticisms of Green. The variety 
of ways of meeting the person-level requirement just discussed could help persuade her 
otherwise. Self-expression does have to be person-level, but that can be secured even if a 
stretch of expressive behavior is not voluntary. The first-person accessibility requirement 
links expressing behavior and subject. With that link in place, Davis’s distinction between 
speaker expression and evidential (merely behavioral) expression appears both misplaced 
and too rigid.
60. Recall that this is a sense-level requirement. It will still be possible for a good actress 
to cry without feeling sorrow herself. (Of course, Green won’t count that as a case of self-
expression.)
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61. Because the connections are sense-level, the state expressed isn’t expanded to include 
the content of the convention. So nothing here implies that speakers who express states 
by means of illocutionary acts must be self-consciously following the conventions in 
question.
62. Thus, Green clarifies his requirement as follows: “What is required for expressibility 
is that the state in question fall into some category such that states in that category can in 
general be known by introspection” (2007, 39n11).
63. Whether such states are expressible is controversial, of course. (Green’s account would 
allow us to express them by showing-that we had them.) Bar-On explicitly denies that per-
ceptual experiences—that is, seeings of trees and hearings of crickets—are expressible. For 
arguments that many other mental states have success conditions beyond a subject’s control, 
and hence can’t be self-ascribed in avowing mode (on Bar-On’s account), see Tanney 2007.
64. Since Green denies that all expression is perception-enabling, he would not accept this 
method of breaking out of the circle.
65. A very early version of this paper was presented at the Expression Workshop held 
at Georgetown University on May 11, 2007, and I benefited from discussion with the 
audience and my fellow presenters (Dorit Bar-On, Wayne Davis, Mitchell Green, and 
Stephen Gross). A later version was presented at a Colgate University Philosophy Depart-
ment work-in-progress reading group, and my colleagues offered insightful criticisms. 
Mark Jenkins provided very useful comments on a draft. I am especially grateful for the 
substantial and detailed feedback provided by an anonymous referee for this journal. 
Some of the work on this paper was made possible by a Junior Faculty Leave granted by 
Colgate University.
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